The Question of Fiction – Nonexistent Objects, a Possible World Response From Paul Ricoeur by Fitzpatrick, Noel
Technological University Dublin 
ARROW@TU Dublin 
Articles Fine Arts 
2017-1 
The Question of Fiction – Nonexistent Objects, a Possible World 
Response From Paul Ricoeur 
Noel Fitzpatrick 
Technological University Dublin, noel.fitzpatrick@tudublin.ie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/aaschadpart 
 Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Fine Arts Commons, Metaphysics Commons, and the 
Philosophy of Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fitzpatrick, N. (2017) The question of Fiction – nonexistent objects, a possible world response from Paul 
Ricoeur. KAIROS Journal of Philosophy of Science and Technology, Issue 1, 2017.doi:10.1515/
kjps-2016-0020 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Fine Arts at ARROW@TU Dublin. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of 
ARROW@TU Dublin. For more information, please 
contact yvonne.desmond@tudublin.ie, 
arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, brian.widdis@tudublin.ie. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License 
	  	   1	  
The	  question	  of	  Fiction	  –	  nonexistent	  objects,	  a	  possible	  world	  response	  
from	  Paul	  Ricoeur	  –	  	  
	  
KAIROS-­‐	  Journal	  Philosophy	  of	  Science-­‐	  Lisbon	  issue1,	  2017.	  (Nov	  2016).	  	  	  Dr.	  Noel	  Fitzpatrick,	  	  (Head	  of	  Research,	  College	  of	  Arts	  and	  Tourism,	  	  Dean	  of	  Graduate	  School	  of	  Creative	  Arts	  and	  Media,	  	  Dublin	  Institute	  of	  Technology)	  Email:	  noel.fitzpatrick@dit.ie	  	  	  
Keywords	  Ricoeur,	  fiction,	  nonexistent	  object,	  configurational	  narrative,	  ontological	  status.	  	  	  
Abstract	  The	   question	   of	   fiction	   is	   omnipresent	   within	   the	   work	   of	   Paul	   Ricoeur	  throughout	  his	  prolific	  career.	  However,	  Ricoeur	  raises	  the	  questions	  of	  fiction	  in	  relation	   to	   other	   issues	   such	   the	   symbol,	  metaphor	   and	   narrative.	   This	   article	  sets	  out	  to	  foreground	  a	  traditional	  problem	  of	  fiction	  and	  logic,	  which	  is	  termed	  the	  existence	  of	  non-­‐existent	  objects,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  Paul	  Ricoeur’s	  work	  on	  narrative.	   Ricoeur’s	   understanding	   of	   fiction	   takes	   place	   within	   his	   overall	  philosophical	   anthropology	  where	   the	   fictions	   and	   histories	  make	   up	   the	   very	  nature	   of	   identity	   both	   personal	   and	   collective.	   The	   existence	   of	   non-­‐existent	  objects	   demonstrates	   a	   dichotomy	   between	   fiction	   and	   history,	   non-­‐existent	  objects	   can	   exist	   as	   fictional	   objects.	   The	   very	   possibility	   of	   the	   existence	   of	  fictional	  objects	  entails	  ontological	  status	  considerations.	  What	  ontological	  status	  do	  fictional	  objects	  have?	  Ricoeur	  develops	  a	  concept	  of	  narrative	  configuration	  which	   is	   akin	   to	   the	   Kantian	   productive	   imagination	   and	   configuration	   frames	  the	  question	  historical	  narrative	  and	  fictional	  narrative.	  	  It	  is	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  ontological	   status	  of	   fictional	  objects	   can	  be	  best	  understood	   in	  a	  model	  of	  possible	  worlds.	  	  	   	  
	  	   2	  
Introduction	  	  Within	  the	  huge	  corpus	  of	  work	  by	  Paul	  Ricoeur,	  which	  dates	  from	  the	  late	  1950s	  up	   to	   the	   2004,	   the	   question	   of	   fiction	   appears	   under	   different	   guises	   in	  numerous	   places.	   One	   could	   argue	   from	   the	   earliest	   publication	   History	   and	  
Truth1	  (1955)	   to	   his	   last	   publication	   History,	   Memory,	   Forgetting2	  (2004)	   the	  question	   of	   the	   veracity	   of	   fiction	   has	   been	   raised	   constantly3 .	   However,	  throughout	  his	  prolific	  career	  the	  question	  of	  fiction	  is	  often	  raised	  indirectly,	  for	  example,	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  metaphor	  (in	  the	  The	  Rule	  of	  Metaphor,	  19784)	  or	   in	  relation	   to	   mythology	   (The	   Symbolism	   of	   Evil,	   19605).	   In	   addition,	   within	   the	  work	   of	   Paul	   Ricoeur	   there	   is	   not	   one	   ‘question	   of	   fiction’	   but	   a	   series	   of	  questions	  whereby	  fiction	  is	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  mobilized.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  no	  one	  place	  where	  Ricoeur	  sets	  out	  a	  theory	  of	  fiction,	  fiction	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  is	   often	   understood	   as	   back	   drop	   to	   development	   of	   his	   overall	   philosophical	  anthropology	   or	   hermeneutic	   phenomenology.	  Within	   this	  wider	   philosophical	  framework	   the	   development	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   fiction	   points	   towards	   the	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  distinctions	  that	  can	  be	  made	  between	  the	  facts	  of	  history	  and	  stories.	  The	  blurring	  of	  boundaries	  between	  stories	  and	  histories	  between	   facts	   and	   lies,	   between	   facts	   and	   fiction,	   can	   take	   place	   once	   the	  question	   of	   fiction	   is	   raised	   to	   that	   the	   level	   of	   identity,	   to	   be	   precise,	   the	  construction	   of	   personal	   identity	   as	   well	   as	   collective	   identity.	   Hence,	   for	  example,	  Ricoeur	  can	  claim	  that	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  verifiable	  history	  and	  of	  fiction	   can	   be	   ignored	   because	   identity	   of	   the	   self	   is	   constructed	   through	   both	  history	  and	  fiction.	  	  	  It	   is	   in	   telling	   our	   own	   stories	   that	   we	   give	   ourselves	   an	   identity.	   We	  recognize	   ourselves	   in	   the	   stories	   we	   tell	   ourselves.	   It	   makes	   little	  difference	   whether	   these	   stories	   are	   true	   or	   false,	   fiction	   as	   well	   as	  verifiable	  history	  provides	  us	  with	  identity6.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Histoire	  et	  Vérité,	  Editions	  du	  Seuil,	  Paris,	  1955.	  2	  La	  Mémoire,	  L’Histoire	  et	  L’Oubli,	  Editions	  du	  Seuil,	  Paris,	  2000.	  3	  For	  the	  complete	  bibliography	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Paul	  Riceour	  see	  www.fondsricoeur.com	  	  4	  La	  Métaphore	  Vive,	  Editons	  du	  Seuil,	  Paris,	  1975.	  5	  	  La	  Philosophie	  de	  la	  volonte	  II:	  La	  Symbolique	  du	  Mal,	  Aubier,	  Paris,	  1960.	  6	  ‘History	  as	  Narrative	  Practice’,	  Philosophy	  Today,	  29,	  fall,	  1985,	  p.	  214.	  	  	  
	  	   3	  
It	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	   fiction	   is	  opposed	   to	  verifiable	  history.	  Ricoeur	  has	  from	   his	   earliest	   works	   of	   the	   1950s	   juxtaposed	   the	   subjective	   nature	   of	   the	  historical	   inquiry	   with	   the	   objective	   nature	   of	   the	   science	   of	   history7.	   In	   the	  development	   of	   history	   the	   role	   of	   the	   text	   is	   of	   primary	   importance,	   and	   the	  textual	   construction,	  Ricoeur	  argues,	   is	  part	  of	   the	  very	  reflexive	  process	   itself,	  this	  reflexivity	  is	  part	  of	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  historian	  and	  of	  man	  in	  general.	  	  However,	  the	  problem	  fiction	  has	  been	  formulated	  in	  Philosophy	  in	  terms	  outside	  of	   the	  direct	   relation	  between	  history,	   narrative	   and	   truth.	   It	   has	  been	  raised	   through	   formal	   semantics	  and	   formal	   logic.	  Ricoeur	  does	  not	  attempt	   to	  give	  a	  theory	  of	  fiction	  that	  could	  be	  translated	  into	  formal	  semantics,	  however,	  in	   attempt	   to	   elucidate	   an	   understanding	   of	   what	   Ricoeur’s	   implicit	   theory	   of	  fiction	  could	  be,	   this	   short	  article	  will	   refer	   to	  a	  problematic	  of	   fiction	   that	  has	  come	  to	   the	   fore	  recently.	   In	   formal	   logic	  and	   formal	  semantics	   the	  question	  of	  fiction	  has	  been	  related	  to	  the	  question	  of	  non-­‐existent	  objects.	  The	  question	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  non-­‐existent	  objects	  what	  could	  be	  referred	  to	  more	  generally	  as	  questions	   relating	   to	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   fiction	   (a	   term	   borrowed	   Amie	  Thomasson	   in	  Fiction	  and	  Metaphysics	  (1999)).	   It	  must	  be	   said	   from	   the	  outset	  Ricoeur	   never	   sets	   out	   a	   theory	   directly	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   problematic	   of	   non-­‐existent	   objects,	   however,	   through	   the	   entanglement	   with	   adjacent	   concepts	  such	  as	  narrative,	  phenomenological	  experience	  of	  fiction,	  the	  fictive	  experience	  of	   time	   he	   sets	   out	   a	   mobilization	   of	   fiction	   which	   could	   be	   useful	   for	   the	  development	   of	   a	   possible	   world	   solution	   for	   the	   problematic	   of	   non-­‐existent	  objects.	   There	   is	   risk	   of	   reducing	   Ricoeur’s	   argument	   to	   a	   traditional	   formal	  semantic	  understanding	  of	   fiction	  or	   to	  cognitive	   linguistic	  approach	  to	  Fiction.	  	  However,	   this	   risk	  will	   be	   overcome	   by	   focusing	   initially	   on	   framing	  what	   the	  problem	   of	   fiction	   is	   within	   the	   work	   of	   Paul	   Ricoeur	   and	   by	   resisting	   any	  temptation	  to	  risk	  a	  formal	  semantic	  translation	  of	  an	  implicit	  theory	  of	  fiction.	  It	  is	  through	  the	  question	  of	  time	  and	  our	  experience	  of	  time	  that	  the	  overlap	  can	  occur,	   for	  Ricoeur	  our	  understanding	  of	   time	   is	  one	   that	   takes	  place	   through	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See	  Histoire	   et	   Vérité:	   «	  Cette	   attente	   en	   implique	   une	   autre	   :	   nous	   attendons	   de	   l’historien	   une	   certaine	   qualité	   de	  subjectivité,	  non	  plus	  une	  subjectivité	  quelconque,	  mais	  une	  subjectivité	  qui	  soit	  précisément	  approprie	  a	  l’objectivité	  qui	  convient	  a	  l’histoire…..nous	  attendons	  que	  l’histoire	  soit	  une	  histoire	  des	  hommes	  et	  que	  cette	  histoire	  des	  hommes	  aide	  le	  lecteur,	  instruit	  par	  l’histoire	  des	  historiens,	  a	  édifier	  une	  subjectivité	  de	  haut	  rang.	  »	  p.24	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fictive	   experience	   of	   time.	   Hence,	   instead	   of	   treating	   objects	   as	   objects	   in	   the	  world	  the	  existence	  of	  time	  for	  Ricoeur	  raises	  fundamental	   issues	  in	  relation	  to	  time	  as	  a	  fictional	  device	  and	  as	  element	  of	  the	  world.	  There	  is	  an	  oversimplistic	  dichotomy	   between	   language	   which	   refers	   to	   the	   world	   (of	   experience)	   and	  language	  which	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  world	  (fiction).	  The	  example	  of	  time	  which	  Ricoeur	  analyses	  in	  great	  deal	  in	  Time	  and	  Narrative	  demonstrates	  that	  time	  (as	  an	  abstract	  noun)	  is	  referring	  to	  an	  experience	  which	  is	  fictive	  (narrative	  time)	  and	   non-­‐fictional	   (Chronological	   time).	   	   In	   this	   short	   article,	   the	   question	   of	  fiction	  for	  Ricoeur	  will	  posed	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  treatment	  of	  fictive	  experience	  of	  time	  in	  Time	  and	  Narrative.	  It	  is	  hoped	  that	  his	  development	  of	  the	  configuration	  of	   fictive	   experience	   will	   aid	   in	   the	   understanding	   of	   fiction	   in	   more	   general	  terms	   outside	   the	   strict	   constraints	   of	   fiction	   as	   the	   existence	   of	   non-­‐existent	  objects.	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Part	  1	  :	  The	  problem	  with	  Fiction	  	  The	   possibility	   of	   the	   existence	   non-­‐existent	   objects,	   or	   fictions,	   raises	  fundamental	   epistemological	   and	   ontological	   questions	   within	   different	  philosophical	   traditions	   and	   none	   the	   more	   so	   than	   within	   the	   philosophical	  hermeneutic	  project	  of	  Paul	  Ricoeur.	   	  For	  the	  moment	  non-­‐existent	  objects	  and	  fictions	  will	  be	  used	  interchangeably,	  however,	  it	  will	  become	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  operating	  within	  the	  use	  of	  fiction	  by	  Ricoeur.	  For	  Ricoeur	  the	  ability	  of	  language	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  real	  world	  or	  possible	  worlds	  becomes	  a	  cornerstone	  for	   the	  development	  of	  philosophical	  project	  where	  the	  mediation	  of	   the	  world	  through	  language	  is	  presupposed.	  For	  Ricoeur,	  this	  turn	  to	  language	  takes	  place	  through	   the	  development	  of	   his	  hermeneutic	  project	  which	   starts	   out	  with	   the	  symbol,	  then	  the	  metaphor,	  then	  the	  text.	  Historically,	  the	  turn	  towards	  language	  can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   work	   of	   Edmund	   Husserl	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   question	   of	  intersubjectivity	  and	  the	  phenomenological	  experience	  and,	  similarly,	  within	  the	  work	   of	   Martin	   Heidegger	   whose	   Dasein	   is	   being	   whose	   questions	   the	   very	  meaning	   of	   being.	   The	   philosophical	   tradition	   of	   hermeneutics	   i.e.	   Dilthey,	  Schleiermacher	  had	  give	  prominence	  to	  the	  role	  of	  language	  and	  interpretation.	  For	  Paul	  Ricoeur	  the	  starting	  out	  within	  the	  thickness	  of	  language	  brings	  with	  it	  all	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  language;	  one	  presupposition	  is	  the	  ability	  of	  language	  to	   refer	   to	   the	  world	   or	   to	   possible	  worlds.	   However,	   this	   opposition	   between	  reference	  to	  the	  world	  and	  reference	  to	  possible	  worlds	  is	  over-­‐simplistic	  as	  the	  whole	  project	  of	  deconstruction	  has	  demonstrated,	  the	  kernel	  critique	  within	  the	  work	  of	  Jacques	  Derrida	  is	  this	  very	  opposition	  itself	  between	  referring	  and	  non-­‐referring.	   Derrida	   explored	   the	   constant	   deferral	   of	   referring	   in	   the	   very	   term	  
différance	  which	  refers	  to	  differing	  and	  deferring	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  It	  could	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  reference	  contains	  within	  an	  ontological	  model	  of	  presence	  which	  Derrida	  sets	  out	  as	  part	  of	  his	  initial	  grammatological	  project	  that	  becomes	  Deconstruction.	  Nonetheless,	  non-­‐referring	  nouns,	  or	  nonexistent	  objects,	   have	   had	   a	   prominent	   place	   in	   the	   history	   of	   philosophy,	   from	   golden	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mountains	  to	  mythological	  figures	  such	  as	  Ulysses	  himself8.	  The	  problematic	  can	  be	  dated	  as	  far	  back	  as	  Plato	  and	  Paramendes	  and	  has	  lead	  to	  the	  development	  of	  numerous	  formal	  responses	  in	  logic,	  for	  example,	  from	  Russell,	  Frege,	  Quine9	  to	  more	  recently	  with	  Priest	  (2005)10.	  The	  origin	  of	  the	  term	  nonexistent	  objects	  is	  attributed	   to	   Alexius	   Meinong,	   who	   was	   a	   student	   of	   Brentano	   and	   would,	  therefore,	  be	  situated	  within	  the	  phenomenological	  tradition.	  In	  phenomenology,	  therefore,	   the	   question	   of	   nonexistent	   objects	   and	   intentionality	   can	   be	   dated	  back	   to	  Meinong.	  Within	   phenomenology	   the	   question	   of	   intentionality	   or	   the	  principle	   of	   intentionality	   refers	   to	   the	   relationship	   with	   the	   world	   which	   is	  constantly	  in	  a	  mode	  of	  attending	  to,	  to	  think	  is	  to	  think	  of	  something,	  to	  speak	  is	  to	   speak	   of	   something.	   To	   simplify	   the	   Meinong	   stance	   we	   could	   say	   that	   the	  central	  issue	  for	  Meinong	  was	  the	  possibility	  desire	  for	  something	  that	  does	  not	  exist	   –	   a	   golden	   mountain,	   therefore,	   intentionality	   does	   not	   require	   the	  existence	  of	  an	  object11.	  	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  question	  of	  intentionality	  cannot	  be	  fully	  explored	  here,	  however,	  suffice	  it	  to	  note	  that	  Meinong	  will	  place	  value-­‐feelings	  as	  the	  mode	  of	  intentionality:	  	  	  Value-­‐feelings	   are	   existence-­‐feelings.	   Already	   implicit	   here	   is	   the	  proposition	   that	   value-­‐feelings	   are	   in	   the	   first	   instance	   oriented	   not	  toward	  a	  certain	  thing,	  but	  toward	  the	  existence	  of	  this	  thing.	  This	  state	  of	  affairs	   comes	   out	   quite	   unmistakably	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   instead	   of	   the	  existence	   of	   the	   thing	   in	   question,	   it	   can	   be	   the	   non-­‐existence	   of	   it	   on	  which	  the	  value	  is	  set.	  (On	  Assumptions	  p.120)	  	  In	   this	   quotation,	   the	   distinction	   is	  made	   between	   the	   desire	   not	   for	   a	   certain	  thing	   in-­‐itself	  but	   the	  very	  existence	  of	   this	   thing	   itself,	  hence	  the	  possibility	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For	  an	  extensive	  overview	  of	  the	  term	  ‘nonexistent	  objects’	  see	  Reicher,	  Maria,	  "Nonexistent	  Objects",	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (Winter	  2015	  Edition),	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta	  (ed.),	  URL	  =	  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/nonexistent-­‐objects/>.	  9	  Frege-­‐Quinne	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  existential	  quantifiers	  and	  existence,	  this	  is	  done	  through	  the	  use	  (∃)	  which	  is	  determined	  as	  having	  an	  ontological	  import.	  	  10	  Graham	  Priest	  (2005)	  has	  proposed	  a	  theory	  of	  nonexistent	  objects	  that	  treats	  “there	  is”	  and	  “exists”	  as	  synonyms.	  He	  interprets	  quantification	  as	  utterly	  ontologically	  neutral.	  The	  quantifier	  should	  express	  neither	  “there	  is”	  nor	  “there	  exists”.	  Rather,	  quantifier	  expressions	  should	  be	  read	  “For	  some	  x,	  …x…”,	  where	  “For	  some	  x,	  …x…”	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  there	  is	  (or	  exists)	  an	  x	  such	  that	  …x…”.	  Nonexistent	  Objects",	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (Winter	  2015	  Edition),	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta	  (ed.),	  	  11	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desire	  for	  something	  not	  to	  exist.	  The	  value	  feelings	  which	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  existent	   desire/feelings	   can	   be	   the	   desire	   of	   the	   non-­‐existent	   and	   hence	   the	  existence	  of	  the	  non-­‐existent	  object.	  	  However,	   we	   could	   also	   find	   a	   parallel	   within	   the	   notion	   of	   value	  judgment	   or	   the	   Kantian	   notion	   of	   critique.	   For	   Kant	   the	   in	   the	   Critique	   of	  
Judgment	   the	   very	   notion	   of	   judgment	   is	   based	   on	   the	   ability	   ‘to	   think	   the	  particular	   as	   contained	   under	   the	   universal’12,	   the	   ability	   to	   abstract	   from	   the	  particular	  to	  the	  universal.	  The	  judgment	  can	  also	  be	  transcendental	  as	  it	  sets	  out	  a	   priori	   the	   conditions	   necessary	   for	   the	  movement	   from	   the	   particular	   to	   the	  universal.	   Hence,	   once	   the	   question	   of	   the	   movement	   beyond	   the	   particular	  empirical	   experience	   is	   framed	   by	   Kant	   in	   terms	   a	   movement	   towards	  transcendental	   a	   priori	   which	   is	   beyond	   experience,	   the	   question	   of	  representation	   of	   something	   which	   does	   not	   exist	   is	   posed.	   Kant	   poses	   the	  concept	  as	  which	  is	  beyond	  the	  object	  (the	  objectness	  of	  the	  object).	  At	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  question	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  non-­‐existent	  object	  is	  the	  Kantian	  distinction	  between	  concept	  of	  an	  object	  and	  the	  object’s	  actuality.	  As	  Kant	  states:	  Now	   insofar	   as	   the	   concept	   of	   an	   object	   also	   contains	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  object’s	  actuality,	   the	  concept	   is	   called	   the	   thing’s	  purpose,	   and	  a	   thing’s	  harmony	   with	   that	   character	   of	   things	   which	   is	   possible	   only	   through	  purposes	  is	  called	  the	  purposiveness.	  (Critique	  of	  judgment,	  p.20)	  	  The	  thing’s	  purpose	   is	  also	  contained	  within	   the	   things	  concept	  and	  the	   thing’s	  concept	  is	  distinction	  the	  things	  actuality	  as	  an	  object.	  Hence	  within	  the	  Kantian	  analysis	  for	  our	  analysis	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  object	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  object.	  This	  enables	  a	  further	  distinction	  between	  notions	  of	   concrete	   denotative	   language	   referring	   and	   abstract	   denotative	   referring	  which	  can	  be	  descriptive	  and	  temporal	  or	  durational	  references.	  The	  reference	  to	  action	   taking	   place	   and	   time	   in	   the	  world	   –	   to	   reach	   the	   summit13for	   example	  refers	  to	  something	  that	  comes	  into	  being	  once	  it	  is	  achieved.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Kant,	  The	  Critique	  of	  Judgment,	  p.	  18.	  	  13	  This	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  verb	  categorization	  or	  verbal	  typologies	  where	  verbs	  can	  determined	  as	  durative,	  temporal,	  instantaneous	  etc.	  For	  a	  full	  analysis	  see	  verbal	  typologies	  see	  Vendler,	  Zeno.	  ‘Philosophical	  review’.	  In:	  
Linguistics	  and	  Philosophy.	  2.	  1957,	  P.	  415-­‐434.	  Vendler’s	  typology	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  first	  attempt	  to	  give	  a	  complete	  typology	  of	  verbal	  forms	  his	  classification	  is	  state,	  activity,	  accomplishment	  and	  achievement.	  	  	  	  
	  	   8	  
	  	  	   Nonexistent	  objects,	  therefore,	  pose	  fundamental	  questions	  in	  relation	  to	  language	   and	   the	  world,	   in	   particular	   in	   relation	   the	   referring	   nouns	   and	  non-­‐referring	  nouns.	  Let	  us	  take	  a	  relatively	  simple	  example	  of	  what	  the	  problem	  of	  fiction	   is	   and	   how	   this	   can	   be	   framed	   in	   relation	   to	   nonexistent	   objects.	   The	  example	  is	  the	  first	  line	  of	  James	  Joyce’s	  Ulysses	  it	  reads	  as	  follows:	  	  	  “Stately,	  plump	  Buck	  Mulligan	  came	  from	  the	  stairhead,	  bearing	  a	  bowl	  of	  lather	  on	  which	  a	  mirror	  and	  a	  razor	  lay	  crossed”	  (p.5).	  	  	  This	   famous	   opening	   scene	   of	   the	   novel	   where	   the	   central	   character	   Stephen	  Dedalus	  is	  presented	  through	  a	  secondary	  character	  Buck	  Mulligan	  in	  the	  tower	  on	  Sandycove	  beach	  as	  he	  wakes	  up	  on	  June	  16th	  morning	  in	  Dublin.	  In	  order	  to	  elucidate	  the	  problem,	  the	  question	  of	  fiction	  could	  be	  oversimplified	  as	  ‘how	  do	  readers	   distinguish	   between	   language	   which	   refers	   to	   the	   real	   world	   and	  language	  that	  refers	  to	  an	  imaginary	  one	  shared	  by	  the	  author,	  narrator	  and	  the	  reader’.	  On	  the	  surface	  language	  expressions	  there	  would	  appear	  at	  first	  glance	  to	  be	  no	  linguistic	  differences	  within	  this	  sentence	  that	  would	  mark	  it	  as	  fiction.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  past	  tense	  preterit	  (came)	  (crossed)14,	  nominal	  referring	  entities	  (nouns),	   and	   referring	  expressions	   such	  Buck	  Mulligan,	   stairhead,	  bowl,	   lather,	  mirror,	  razor	  would	  all	  be	  present	  in	  a	  historical	  account	  which	  is	  non-­‐fictional.	  However,	   this	   is	   a	   radical	   oversimplification,	   the	   sentence	   is	   fictional	   and	   how	  that	  fictionality	  is	  determined	  is	  the	  central	  issue	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  nonexistent	  objects.	   A	   more	   close	   analysis	   of	   the	   sentence	   from	   literary	   theory	   or	   critical	  theory	   perspective	   raises	   the	   traces	   of	   points	   of	   view	  within	   the	   sentence,	   the	  traces	   of	   the	   point	   view	   enable	   a	   distinction	   between	   statement	   (énoncé)	   and	  utterance	   (énonciation).	   Within	   the	   field	   of	   linguistics	   the	   tradition	   of	  enunciative	   linguistics,	  which	  stems	   from	  the	  work	  of	  Emile	  Benenviste,	  would	  argue	   that	   there	   is	   a	   trace	  of	   the	   act	   of	   utterance	  within	   the	   statement	   itself15.	  	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  here	  through	  the	  use	  of	  an	  ‘ing’	  form	  in	  ‘bearing’,	  indicating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  ‘Lay	  crossed’,	  raises	  an	  interesting	  problematic	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  past	  participle	  as	  adjectival	  forms	  and	  past	  participle	  as	  agentless	  passive	  forms	  –	  the	  razor	  was	  crossed	  by	  someone.	  However,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  the	  time	  to	  explore	  the	  fully	  complexity	  of	  this	  sentence.	  	  15	  Ses	  Emile	  Benveniste	  for	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘De	  la	  subjectivite	  dans	  le	  langage’,	  Problemes	  de	  linguistique	  générale	  Tome	  1	  and	  this	  is	  further	  developed	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  implicit	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Oswald	  Ducrot.	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a	   non-­‐complete	   action	   or	   an	   action	   in	   process	   depending	   on	   the	   grammatical	  perspective	   adopted.	   This	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   action	   taking	   place	   is	   also	  emphasized	   through	   the	   juxtaposition	   of	   tense,	   ‘came	   from	   the	   stairhead	  bearing’.	   The	   point	   of	   view	   is	   equally	   present	   not	   only	   in	   the	   grammatical	  structures	  but	  also	  at	  a	  semantic	  level,	  the	  use	  of	  stately,	  plump.	  This	  analysis	  of	  the	   sentence	  which	  attempts	   to	   find	  markers	  within	   the	   sentence	   that	   indicate	  forms	  of	  fictionality	  is	  itself	  problematic	  as	  the	  analysis	  itself	  is	  mobilizing	  forms	  of	   literary	   analysis	   of	   critical	   theory	   analysis	   which	   rely	   on	   specific	   linguistic	  analyses.	   The	   problematic	   of	   fiction	   is	   seen,	   therefore,	   primarily	   as	   stylistic;	   a	  stylistic	   analysis	  underpinned	  by	  a	   linguistics	  of	   the	   surface	   traces	  of	   language	  operations.	  	  However,	  in	  terms	  of	  non-­‐existent	  objects	  we	  could	  formulate	  it	  as	  follows	  	  ‘Stephen	   Dedalus’,	   the	   central	   character	   in	   James	   Joyce’s	   Ulysses,	   is	   a	   non-­‐referring	  noun,	  as	  Stephen	  Dedalus	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  real	  person	  in	  the	  world.	  However,	   automatically	   the	   complexity	  of	   the	   issue	   comes	   to	   the	   fore,	   Stephen	  Dedalus	  does	   refer	   to	   something,	   yet	   that	   something	  does	  not	   exist	   in	   the	   real	  world.	   In	  addition,	   the	  naming	  of	   fictional	  character	  Stephen	   takes	  on	  different	  forms,	   even,	   in	   the	   opening	   sequence,	   he	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   different	   names	   (as	  named	  entities)	  ‘Kinch’,	  ‘feaful	  jesuit’,	  ‘old	  chap’,	  my	  love’.	  The	  difficult	  of	  naming	  becomes	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  the	  novel	  where	  the	  son	  is	  search	  of	  a	  father	  and	  the	  father	  of	  a	  son	  –	  a	  name	  in	  search	  of	  thing.	  	  From	  a	  formal	  semantics	  perspective	  we	   could	   use	   an	   approach	   which	   might	   help	   distinguish	   between	   Stephen	  Dedalus	  (noun	  referring	  to	  the	  real	  world)	  and	  {Stephen	  Dedalus}	  (non-­‐referring	  to	  the	  real	  world	  but	  to	  a	  possible	  world).	  However,	  even	  this	  formal	  distinction	  does	   not	   advance	   our	   argument,	   as	   Thomasson	   has	   pointed	   out	   that	   fictional	  entities	  i.e	  {Stephen	  Dedalus}	  are	  equally	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  actual	  world	  just	  as	  non-­‐fictional	  ones	  are	  i.e	  Stephen	  Dedalus.	  The	  fundamental	  presupposition	  here	  is	  one	  of	  the	  ontological	  status,	  Thomasson,	  therefore,	  attributes	  full	  ontological	  status	  to	  fictional	  entities,	  they	  are	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  actual	  world,	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  exist	  in	  and	  across	  multiple	  readings	  and	  interpretations	  of	  the	  reader	  and	   in	   the	   imagination	   of	   the	   author.	   The	   ontological	   status	   of	   the	   fictional	  entities	   is	   in	   a	   process	   of	   sedimentation	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   novel,	   their	  ontological	   status	   accumulates	   through	   an	   interdependency	   of	   historical	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reference	  to	  themselves	  (anaphoric	  and	  cataphoric	  reference)	  within	  the	  text	  of	  the	  novel.	  	  	  It	   is	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Artifactual	   Theory	   of	   Fiction	   proposed	   by	  Thomasson	   that	   the	   exploration	   of	   fiction	   and	   narrative	   configuration	   in	   the	  work	   of	   Ricoeur	   overlap.	   The	   distinction	   that	   Thomasson	   makes	   between	  fictional	   works	   as	   semantic-­‐syntactic	   entities	   as	   different	   to	   fictional	   objects,	  reflects	   a	   parallel	   distinction	   made	   between	   world	   of	   fiction	   and	   fictional	  configuration	  in	  the	  Ricoeur’s	  analysis	  in	  Time	  and	  Narrative.	  This	  overlap	  could	  be	   determined,	   as	   is	   it	   will	   be	   argued	   later,	   by	   a	   possible	   world	   framework.	  Possible	  world	  frameworks	  enable	  the	  establishment	  of	  fictional	  entities	  in	  other	  worlds	  outside	  the	  actual	  world.	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Part	  II	  :	  Ricoeur	  and	  the	  world	  of	  the	  work,	  working	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Art.	  	  	  	  	  The	  problem	  of	  fiction	  is	  given	  a	  predominant	  role	  in	  the	  overall	  project	  of	  Time	  
and	  Narrative	  but	  it	  is	  outlined	  fully	  in	  the	  second	  volume	  whose	  subtitle	  is	  ‘The	  configuration	   of	   time	   in	   fictional	   narrative’.	   In	   this	   volume	   Ricoeur	   explores	  explicitly	  the	  role	  of	  fictional	  configurations	  and	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  volume	  gives	   a	   very	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   some	   key	   canonical	   literary	   texts	   by	   Virginna	  Wolf,	  Thomas	  Mann	  and	  Marcel	  Proust.	  This	  detailed	  exploration	  demonstrates	  that	   there	   is	  a	   fictive	  experience	  of	   time	  which	  we	  shall	  return	  to	  slightly	   later.	  Nonetheless,	   at	   the	   outset	   of	   volume	   two	   Ricoeur	   makes	   very	   explicit	   the	  epistemological	   claim	   to	   true	   narrative	   that	   historical	   narrative	   holds.	  Throughout	   Time	   and	   Narrative	   Ricoeur	   distinguishes	   between	   historical	  narrative	  and	  fictional	  narrative,	  historical	  narrative	  maintains	  its	  truth	  value	  as	  reference	   to	   the	   actual	   world.	   It	   is	   this	   truth	   value	   ambition	   of	   historical	  narrative	  that	  enables	  the	  formulation	  of	  fiction	  as	  a	  distinct	  and	  different	  form.	  One	  defining	   characteristic	   of	   “fiction”,	   for	  Paul	  Ricoeur,	   is	   the	   ambition	  not	   to	  constitute	  a	  true	  narrative.	  	  I	  am	  giving	  the	  term	  “fiction”	  a	  narrower	  extension	  than	  that	  adopted	  by	  many	   authors	   who	   take	   it	   to	   be	   synonymous	   with	   “narrative	  configuration”.	  This	  equating	  of	  narrative	  and	  fiction,	  of	  course,	  has	  some	  justification	   inasmuch	   as	   the	   configurating	   acts,	   as	   I	   myself	   have	  maintained,	   an	   operation	   of	   the	   productive	   imagination,	   in	   the	   Kantian	  sense	  of	  the	  term.	  Nevertheless	  I	  am	  reserving	  the	  term	  “fiction”	  for	  those	  literary	   creations	   that	   do	   not	   have	   historical	   narrative’s	   ambition	   to	  constitute	  a	  true	  narrative.	  (Time	  and	  Narrative,	  vol	  2,	  p.3)16	  	  Ricoeur’s	   distinction	   between	   ‘fiction’	   and	   ‘historical’	   narrative	   relies	   on	   the	  teleological	  nature	  of	  the	  texts,	  the	  ambition	  of	  historical	  narrative	  is	  to	  construct	  and	  constitute	  history	  itself,	  the	  verifiable	  facts	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  past,	  the	  telos	  of	  fiction	  is	  not	  the	  same,	  what	  that	  telos	  is,	  is	  another	  question	  be	  it	  aesthetics,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  «	  Fidèle	   à	   la	   convention	   de	   vocabulaire	   adopte	   pour	   le	   premier	   tome,	   je	   donne	   au	   terme	   de	   fiction	   une	   extension	  moindre	  que	   celle	   adoptée	  par	   les	  nombreux	   auteurs	  qui	   le	   tiennent	  pour	   synonyme	  de	   configuration	  narrative.	   Cette	  indentification	   entre	   configuration	   narrative	   et	   fiction	   n’est	   certes	   pas	   sans	   justification,	   dans	   la	   mesure	   ou	   l’acte	  configurant	  est,	  comme	  nous	  l’avons	  nous-­‐mêmes	  soutenu,	  une	  opération	  dans	  l’imagination	  productrice,	  au	  sens	  kantien	  du	  terme.	  Je	  réserve	  toutefois	  le	  terme	  de	  fiction	  pour	  celles	  des	  créations	  littéraires	  qui	  ignorant	  l’ambition	  historique	  de	  constituer	  un	  récit	  vrai.	  »	  Temps	  et	  Récit,	  tome	  2,	  p.12.	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pleasure,	  passing	  the	  time	  but	  that	  is	  the	  question	  of	  literary	  theory.	  The	  purpose	  of	  historical	  narrative	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  purpose	  of	  fiction.	  Another	  aspect	  to	  this	   distinction	   is	   the	   lack	   of	   intervention	   of	   the	   part	   of	   the	   enonciator	   in	   the	  narrative	   itself,	   the	  historical	  narrative	  attempts	   to	  hold	  up	   the	   facts	  of	  history	  objectively	  for	  reflection17.	  	  Fiction,	  therefore,	  refers	  to	  ‘literary	  creations'	  which,	  it	   could	   be	   argued,	   is	   akin	   to	   the	   ‘fictional	   works’	   of	   Thomasson.	   It	   is	   of	  importance	  to	  point	  out	  that	  literary	  creations	  include	  all	  forms	  of	  myths,	  poems,	  etc.	   but	   Ricoeur’s	   analysis	   in	   the	   Time	   and	   Narrative	   will	   focus	   on	   literary	  creations	  which	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  with	  what	  has	  been	  determined	  as	  the	  modern	  novel	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   modern	   novels	   realist	   tendencies.	   Hence,	   the	  examples	  chosen	  and	  given	  a	  full	  analysis	  in	  volume	  II	  of	  Time	  and	  Narrative	  are	  part	  of	  the	  canon	  of	  modern	  novel.	  	  In	   relation	   to	   our	   original	   question	   of	   fiction,	  which	  was	   to	   look	   to	   the	  structure	   to	  determine	   the	  distinction	  between	   fiction	  and	  nonfiction,	  has	  now	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  epistemological	  claim	  of	  the	  text.	  However,	  Ricoeur	  through	  the	   development	   of	   three	   forms	   of	   Memesis,	   namely,	   Memesis	   I-­‐	   imitation,	  Memesis	   II-­‐	   configuring	   and	   Memesis	   III-­‐	   refiguration	   has	   emphasized	   the	  common	  structural	  elements	  between	  historical	  narrative	  and	  fictional	  narrative.	  The	   use	   of	   narrative	   configuration	   is	   the	   common	   ground	   between	   both	  narrative	  modes;	   narrative	   configuration	   take	   places	   through	   the	   development	  on	  notions	  of	  plot	  or	  emplotment	  (mise	  en	  intrigue)	  which	  Ricoeur	  explored	  as	  Memesis	   II.	   The	  difference,	   as	  Ricoeur	  points	   out,	   is	   that	   the	   literary	   critic	   can	  ignore	  the	  difference	  which	  effects	  the	  referential	  dimension	  of	  the	  narrative	  and	  concentrate	   on	   the	   common	   structural	   characteristics	   of	   the	   fictional	   narrative	  and	  the	  historical	  narrative.	  	  (Temps	  et	  Récit,	  vol1,	  p.126).	  	  In	  the	  overall	  work	  of	  Paul	  Ricoeur	  it	  can	  be	  noted	  that	  in	  the	  1960s	  there	  were	  direct	  confrontations	  with	   more	   structuralist	   modes	   of	   analysis	   that	   placed	   the	   emphasis	   the	  revelation	  of	   the	  structure	  of	   the	  text,	   the	  structure	  of	   the	  narrative,	  where	  the	  question	   of	   the	   referential	   nature	   of	   fiction	   could	   be	   suspended	   or	   totally	  ignored.	   It	   is,	   therefore,	   in	   closure	   of	   fiction	   to	   self-­‐referentially	  which	   enables	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Emile	  Benveniste	  gives	  very	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  differentiation	  between	  ‘discours’	  and	  ‘histoire’,	  the	  primary	  distinction	  is	  that	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  speaker	  and	  what	  is	  being	  said	  as	  temporal	  distance	  and	  without	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  speaker	  and	  the	  second	  is	  the	  historical	  intention	  of	  the	  text.	  p.239,	  Problemes	  de	  linguistique	  generale,	  tome1.	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the	  development	  of	  modes	  of	  literary	  criticism	  where	  the	  semiotic	  nature	  of	  the	  text	  and	  fiction	  is	  developed.	  	  Within	  the	  analysis	  of	  time	  Ricoeur	  demonstrates	  the	   achronic	   analysis	   of	   narratology	   or	   narrative	   semiology	   raises	   questions	  about	   the	  nature	  of	  Time	  or	   the	   fictive	  experience	  of	   time.	  The	  parallel	  here	   is	  between	  Thomsson’s	  claim	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  semantic-­‐syntatic	  entities,	  the	   closed	   semiology	  of	   the	   text,	   and	   the	   fictional	  object,	   the	  world	  of	   the	   text,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  opening	  of	  language	  onto	  the	  possible	  world	  of	  fiction.	  	  	  	  However,	  in	  this	  short	  article	  we	  do	  no	  have	  the	  space	  to	  elaborate	  on	  the	  fully	   consequences	   on	   the	   treatment	   of	   time	   by	   fiction.	   Ricoeur	   distinguishes	  	  between	   different	   forms	   of	   time,	   chronological	   and	   non-­‐chronological.	   In	  addition,	   narrative	   time	  which	  might	   appear	   to	  be	   the	  placeholder	   of	   fiction	   is	  shown	  not	  to	  be	  a	  primordial	  characteristic	  of	  fiction,	  narrative	  time	  is	  present	  in	  fiction	   and	   non	   fiction.	   	   Nonetheless,	   for	   the	   moment	   suffice	   it	   to	   note	   the	  common	   ground	  which	   Ricoeur	   points	   to	   in	   relation	   to	   fictional	   narrative	   and	  historical	  narrative	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  configuration.	  	  The	  configuration	  of	  time	  as	  whole	  which	  is	  chronological	  as	  finite	  but	  also	  cosmological	  as	  infinite,	  it	  is	  this	  act	  of	  configuration	  which	  will	  be	  distinctive	  of	  Ricoeur’s	  analysis	  of	  time.	  The	  concept	  of	  configuration,	  which	  Ricoeur	  borrows	  from	  Louis.	  O	  Mink	  and	  Aristotle,	  enables	  him	  to	  develop	  a	  second	  form	  of	  memesis,	  moving	  beyond	  the	  simple	  action	  of	  imitation	  of	  copy	  that	  was	  the	  characteristic	  of	  memesis	  I.	  It	  is	   as	   a	   configurational	   act	   that	   Ricoeur	   applies	   the	   concept	   to	   historical	  comprehension	  and	  also	  includes	  all	  forms	  of	  narrative	  intelligence	  (note,	  p.129,	  
Temps	   et	   Recit	   vol,	   1).	   	   The	   configurational	   act	   is	   both	   chronologic	   and	   non-­‐chronologic:	  	  This	   configurational	   act	   consists	   of	   “grasping	   together”	   the	   detailed	  actions	   or	   what	   I	   have	   called	   the	   story’s	   incidents.	   It	   draws	   from	   this	  manifold	  of	  events	  the	  unity	  of	  one	  temporal	  whole.	  (Time	  and	  Narrative,	  
vol,	  p.66).18	  	  The	   operation	   of	   configuration	   takes	   into	   account	   the	   whole	   of	   the	   actions’	  details	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  unit	  which	  is	  a	  temporal	  totality.	  	  A	  temporal	  unity	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Cet	  acte	  configurant	  consiste	  à	  “prendre	  ensemble”	  les	  actions	  de	  détail	  ou	  ce	  que	  nous	  avons	  appelé	  les	  incidents	  de	  l’histoire;	  de	  ce	  divers	  d’évènements,	  il	  tire	  l’unité	  d’une	  totalité	  temporelle.	  (Temps	  et	  Récit,	  vol,1.,	  p.129)	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which	   refers	   to	   total	   temporality	   beyond	   the	   individual	   incidents	   of	   the	   story,	  beyond	   the	   individual	   events	  of	   the	   story.	  The	   configurational	   act,	   is	   the	  act	  of	  plot	  or	  emplotment	  which	  takes	  as	  reference	  the	  overall	  unit	  of	   time.	  Ricoeur’s	  analysis	   of	   the	   act	   of	   the	   whole	   gathering/grasping	   together	   (‘prendre	  ensemble’)	   has	   another	   significant	   origin	   whose	   genealogy	   can	   be	   traced	   to	  Kant’s	  operation	  of	  judgement.	  	   It	   will	   be	   recalled	   that	   for	   Kant	   the	   transcendental	   meaning	   of	   judging	  consists	  not	   so	  much	   in	   joining	  a	   subject	   to	  a	  predicate	  as	   in	  placing	  an	  intuitive	  manifold	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  a	  concept.	  (Time	  and	  Narrative,	  Vol	  1,	  p.66).19	  	  	  	  The	  transcendental	  sense	  of	  the	  judgment	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  place	  the	  particular	  in	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  concept.	  As	  Kant	  states:	  	  	  Judgment	   in	   general	   is	   the	   ability	   to	   think	   the	   particular	   as	   contained	  under	   the	   universal.	   If	   the	   universal	   (the	   rule,	   principle,	   law)	   is	   given,	  then	   judgment,	   which	   subsumes	   the	   particular	   under	   it,	   is	   determinate	  (even	   though	   [in	   its	   role]	   as	   transcendental	   judgment	   it	   states	   a	   priori	   the	  conditions	   that	   must	   be	   met	   for	   subsumption	   under	   that	   universal	   to	   be	  possible.	  (Critique	  of	  Judgement,	  p.18).	  	  The	   aesthetic	   judgement	   of	   taste	   is	   opposed	   to	   determining	   judgement	   in	   the	  sense	  that	  the	  aesthetic	  judgement	  of	  taste	  reflects	  the	  total	  as	  free	  play	  between	  understanding	   and	   imagination.	   The	   similarity,	   is	   therefore,	   between	   the	  aesthetic	  judgment	  and	  the	  configurational	  act,	  an	  act	  which	  attempts	  to	  include	  the	   whole.	   It	   is	   the	   configurative	   element	   thanks	   to	   which	   the	   emplotment	  transforms	   the	   events	   into	   story/history.	   The	   configurational	   act	   is	   the	  productive	   imagination	   in	   the	   Kantian	   scheme.	   It	   is	   within	   the	   concept	   of	  emplotment	  that	  Ricoeur’s	  analysis	  moves	  to	  the	  problematic	  of	  the	  world	  of	  the	  text	  or	  the	  “world	  of	  the	  work”.	  	  The	   possible	   world	   of	   the	   work,	   the	   world	   of	   the	   text,	   enables	   the	  development	   of	   a	   problematic	   and	   terminology	   which	   takes	   referentiality	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  On	  se	  souvient	  que	  pour	  Kant	  le	  sens	  transcendantal	  du	  jugement	  consiste	  moins	  á	  joindre	  un	  sujet	  et	  un	  prédicat	  qu’a	  placer	  un	  divers	  intuitif	  sous	  la	  règle	  d’un	  concept	  (Temps	  et	  Récit,	  vol	  I,	  p.129).	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central	   issue.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   here	   that	   before	   Ricoeur	   develops	   an	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  different	  forms	  of	  fiction,	  his	  emphasis	  is	  constantly	  related	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  fictional	  experience	  in	  an	  overall	  hermeneutic	  project	  where	  self-­‐understanding	   is	   mediated	   through	   language	   and,	   therefore,	   through	  different	   modes	   of	   narrative.	   It	   is	   world	   before	   the	   text	   or	   after	   the	   text,	   for	  Ricoeur	  this	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  fiction	  itself:	  	  Fiction,	   I	   have	   said,	   continually	   makes	   the	   transition	   between	   the	  experience	  that	  precedes	  the	  text	  and	  the	  experience	  that	  follows	  it.	  (Time	  
and	  Narrative,	  vol	  2,	  p.73)20.	  	  It	   is	   this	   openness	   of	   the	   text	   onto	   the	   world	   that	   brings	   Ricoeur’s	   analysis	  beyond	  literary	  analysis,	  language	  is	  closed	  to	  world	  and	  open	  to	  the	  world,	  the	  text	  is	  closed	  up	  itself	  as	  self-­‐referential	  semantic-­‐synaxtic	  object	  and	  open	  to	  the	  world	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  meaning.	  The	  philosophical	  implications	  are	  in	  relation	  to	   the	   framing	   of	   questions	   of	   the	   self	   as	   a	   narrative	   self	  which	   is	   constructed	  through	  fiction	  and	  non-­‐fiction,	  what	  Ricoeur	  has	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  hermeneutic	  approach	   to	   subjectivity.	   In	   Volume	   II	   of	   Time	   and	   Narrative	  Ricoeur	   gives	   a	  thorough	  examination	  of	  specific	  forms	  of	  the	  modern	  novel.	  The	  closed	  world	  of	  the	   semiological	   narratology	   of	   textual	   analysis	   and	   literary	   analysis	   is	  confronted	  by	  an	  opening	  of	  the	  text	  on	  the	  world	  –	  the	  world	  of	  the	  work	  and	  to	  the	  world	  of	  the	  reader.	  The	  world	  of	  reader	  is	  interchangeable	  with	  the	  notion	  of	   the	  real	  world	  referred	   to	  earlier	   in	   relation	   to	  Stephen	  Dedalus.	  As	  Ricoeur	  states	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  Vol	  II	  of	  Time	  and	  Narrative:	  	  To	   open	   up	   the	   notion	   of	   emplotment	   –	   and	   the	   notion	   of	   time	   that	  corresponds	   to	   it-­‐	   to	   the	   outside	   is	   to	   follow	   the	   movement	   of	  transcendence	  by	  which	  every	  work	  of	  fiction,	  whether	  verbal	  or	  plastic,	  narrative	  or	  lyric	  projects	  a	  world	  outside	  itself,	  one	  that	  can	  be	  called	  the	  “world	  of	  the	  work”.	  In	  this	  way,	  epics,	  dramas,	  and	  novels	  project,	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  fiction,	  ways	  of	  inhabiting	  the	  world	  that	  lie	  waiting	  to	  be	  taken	  up	   by	   reading,	   which	   in	   turn	   is	   capable	   of	   providing	   a	   space	   of	   a	  confrontation	  between	  the	  world	  of	  the	  text	  and	  the	  world	  of	  the	  reader.	  (Time	  and	  Narrative,	  vol	  II,	  p.5)21.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  «	  La	  fiction,	  on	  l’a	  dit,	  ne	  cesse	  de	  faire	  transition	  entre	  l’expérience	  en	  amont	  du	  texte	  et	  l’expérience	  an	  aval.	  »,	  Temps	  
et	  Récit,	  tome	  2,	  p.	  138.	  21	  «	  Ouvrir	  sur	  le	  dehors	  la	  notion	  de	  mise	  en	  intrigue	  et	  celle	  de	  temps	  qui	  lui	  est	  appropriée,	  c’est	  enfin	  suivre	  le	  mouvement	  de	  transcendance	  par	  lequel	  toute	  œuvre	  de	  fiction,	  qu’elle	  soit	  verbale	  ou	  plastique,	  narrative	  ou	  lyrique,	  projette	  hors	  d’elle-­‐même	  un	  monde	  qu’on	  peut	  appeler	  le	  monde	  de	  l’œuvre.	  Ainsi	  l’épopée,	  le	  drame,	  le	  roman	  projettent	  sur	  le	  mode	  de	  fiction	  des	  manieres	  d’habiter	  le	  monde	  qui	  sont	  en	  attente	  d’une	  reprise	  par	  la	  lecture,	  capable	  a	  son	  tour	  de	  fournir	  un	  espace	  de	  confrontation	  entre	  le	  monde	  du	  texte	  et	  le	  monde	  du	  lecteur.	  Temps	  et	  Recit,	  tome	  2,	  p.	  15.	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  This	   confrontation	   between	   the	  world	   of	   the	   text	   and	   the	  world	   of	   the	   reader	  points	  towards	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  work	  of	  fiction	  to	  project	  a	  world	  outside	  of	  itself,	  or	  Ricoeur	  states	  ways	  of	   inhabiting	  the	  world	  that	  are	  to	  instantiated	  by	  the	   act	   of	   reading	   itself.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   fiction,	   this	   confrontation	   is	  parallel	  with	  the	  confrontation	  between	  langue	  et	  parole/discours;	  language	  and	  discourse.	  Language	  is	  closed	  in	  on	  itself	  as	  self-­‐referential	  system	  and	  open	  as	  discourse,	  an	  aboutness	  of	  discourse,	  discourse	  is	  always	  ‘about	  something’.	  The	  ability	   for	   the	   literary	   to	   abolish	   all	   demonstrative	   or	   diegietic	   or	   ostensive	  nature	  of	  language	  where	  all	  reference	  to	  reality	  can	  be	  abolished	  enables	  what	  we	   call	   literature	   to	   exist.	   As	   Ricoeur	   states	   in	   a	   short	   article	   “La	   fonction	  herméneutique	   de	   distanciation”:	   ‘C’est	   semble-­‐t-­‐il,	   le	   rôle	   de	   la	   plus	   grande	  partie	  de	  notre	  littérature	  de	  détruire	  le	  monde.’22	  The	  destruction	  of	  the	  world,	  is	  not	   the	  destruction	  of	   the	  world	  of	   the	   reader,	  on	   the	  contrary	   the	   reader	   is	  confronted	  with	  new	  possible	  way	  of	  inhabiting	  the	  world	  through	  an	  encounter	  with	  world	   of	   the	  work.	  We	   come	   to	   understand	   through	   this	   detour	   into	   the	  possible	  worlds	  of	  fiction.	  Ricoeur	  adds	  another	  aspect	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  fiction	  by	   exploring	  what	   the	   proposition	   is	   of	   the	  world	   of	   the	   text,	   the	  world	   is	   not	  something	  which	  is	  behind	  the	  text	  but	  something,	  like	  a	  hidden	  intentionality	  to	  be	  revealed,	  but	  something	  in	  front	  of	  the	  text	  as	  the	  work	  unfolds,	  discovers	  and	  revels23.	  Here	   in	   addition	   to	   a	   theory	  of	   fiction	  an	   implicit	   theory	  of	   reading	   is	  being	  proposed,	   to	  understand	  oneself	  before	   the	   text	   is	   to	  expose	  oneself	   to	  a	  much	   larger	   proposition	   of	   world	   or	   possible	   worlds.	   Ultimately,	   to	   receive	   a	  much	  bigger	  self.	  This	  has	  radical	  implications	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  fiction,	  the	  theory	   of	   fiction	   is	   inherently	   embedded	  within	   a	   theory	   of	   reading	  where	   the	  world	  of	  the	  text	  is	  real	  only	  in	  the	  way	  that	  is	  fictional.	  	  Il	   faut	   sans	   doute	   aller	   plus	   loin	   encore	   :	   de	   la	   même	   manière	   que	   le	  monde	  du	   texte	  n’est	   réel	  que	  dans	   la	  mesure	  ou	   il	   est	   fictif,	   il	   faut	  dire	  que	   la	   subjectivité	   lecteur	  n’advient	  a	  elle-­‐même	  que	  dans	   la	  mesure	  ou	  elle	   est	  mise	   en	   suspens,	   irréalisée,	   potentialisée,	   au	  même	   titre	   que	   le	  monde	   lui-­‐même	   que	   le	   texte	   déploie	   (La	   fonction	   Herméneutique	   de	  Distanciation,	  pp.73,	  pp.74).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  ‘La	  fonction	  herméneutique	  de	  distanciation’,	  in	  Cinq	  Etudes	  Herméneutiques,	  p.69.	  23	  Ibid.,	  p.73.	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The	   world	   of	   fiction	   enables	   the	   reader’s	   subjectivity	   to	   be	   suspended	   but	  realised	   through	   the	   interaction	  with	   the	  possible	  world	  of	   the	  work	  of	   fiction.	  	  The	   reader	   is	   gives	   a	   possible	   ontological	   status	   to	   the	   fiction	   through	   their	  ability	  to	  interpret	  themselves	  in	  light	  on	  the	  fictional	  experiences.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  fiction,	  understood	  as	  the	  opposition	  between	  reference	  to	  the	  world	  outside	  the	  text	   is	  confronted	  with	  Ricoeur’s	  contention	  the	  world	  of	   the	  reader	  has	  an	  ontological	  status.	  The	  attribution	  of	  full	  ontological	  status	  to	  the	  character	  of	  the	  novel	  in	  the	  world	  of	  imagination	  of	  the	  reader	  finds	  a	  parallel	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  Ricoeur	  where	  the	  world	  of	  the	  work	  and	  the	  world	  of	  the	  reader	  are	  given	  equal	  status.	  However,	  it	  is	  only	  by	  losing	  my	  self	  as	  reader	  that	  I	  find	  myself	  through	  wider	   experience	   of	   inhabiting	   the	  possible	  world	   of	   the	  word.	   The	   referential	  aspect	  of	  the	  nonexistence	  object	  takes	  place	  within	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  world	  of	  fiction	  itself.	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